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WORKING THE NEXUS: 
TEACHING STUDENTS TO THINK, READ 
AND PROBLEM-SOLVE LIKE A LAWYER  
 
KATE GALLOWAY,∗ MARY HEATH,∗∗ ALEX STEEL,∗∗∗ ANNE 
HEWITT,+ MARK ISRAEL++ AND NATALIE SKEAD+++ 
I  INTRODUCTION 
The nature and purpose of Australian legal education has changed 
over time1 but it is at least arguable that one constant has been the 
importance of law students learning to think: more particularly, learning 
to think ‘like lawyers’. 2  Despite agreement on thinking as a 
fundamental legal skill,3 giving content to this concept has generated 
debate within the academy4 and the profession. There is also some 
debate about why the many law students who will never be lawyers 
need to learn to think like lawyers. Further, even if there were 
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1  See, eg, Nickolas J James, ‘A Brief History of Critique in Australian Legal 
Education’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 965; Mary Keyes and 
Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality, and Prospects for 
the Future’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 537; Margaret Thornton, ‘The Idea of the 
University and the Contemporary Legal Academy’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 
481; Margaret Thornton, Privatising the Public University: The Case of Law 
(Routledge, 2011). 
2  See discussion in Peter John Macmillan, Thinking Like An Expert Lawyer: 
Measuring Specialist Legal Expertise Through Think-Aloud Problem Solving and 
Verbal Protocol Analysis (PhD Thesis, Bond University, 2015) 15-22 
<http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=these
s>.  
3  Evidenced through the broad agreement reached across the tertiary sector and 
admissions authorities in the threshold learning outcomes for law: Sally Kift, Mark 
Israel and Rachael Field, Bachelor of Laws Learning and Teaching Academic 
Standards Statement (Australian Learning & Teaching Council, 2010). 
4  See overview in Nick James, ‘Logical, Critical and Creative: Teaching “Thinking 
Skills” to Law Students’ (2012) 21(1) Queensland University of Technology Law and 
Justice Journal 66, particularly at 68-9 citing Michelle Sanson, ‘Thinking Like a 
Lawyer’ (2006) International Bar Association Conference Newsletter. Cf Larry O 
Natt Gannt, ‘Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive 
Components of the Analytical Mind’ (2007) 29 Campbell Law Review 413. 
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agreement on what ‘thinking like a lawyer’ really means, how to teach 
legal thinking effectively remains relatively obscure.5  
Access to professional development that might support the teaching 
skills of law teachers in relation to thinking skills is therefore crucial. 
While the framework presented in this article arises from professional 
development resources we have developed as part of the Australian 
Government Office for Learning and Teaching-funded Smart Casual 
Project, 6  we suggest that teaching support which is of benefit to 
sessional academics is equally likely to benefit permanent colleagues. 
To this end, we draw on our work in the Smart Casual Project, offering 
law teachers a case study of the systematic development of an explicit 
approach to teaching thinking skills in law. 
This article identifies the knowledge a law teacher might need to be 
able to teach law-specific thinking skills in an existing law curriculum 
within an Australian law degree. Following from that, we analyse how 
component thinking skills might coalesce within a teaching 
environment. Using the umbrella concept of thinking skills, we draw on 
the literature of legal education and on our collective experience to 
identify how law teachers embed three component thinking skills – 
reading law, critical legal thinking and problem solving – as part of a 
comprehended whole, providing concrete examples of integrated 
approaches to thinking skills in particular subjects to demonstrate the 
approach. We argue that through breaking down then building up these 
complex processes in a scaffolded approach, law teachers will be better 
placed to explain to students what is involved in learning law, and to 
identify how best to support student learning. While the genesis of the 
identified categories of thinking skills lies in analysis of the needs of 
sessional law teachers particularly, we present the findings here as 
relevant to all law teachers. Deriving as it does from work with 
sessional law teachers in particular, this approach does not presuppose 
a law teacher with the authority to alter curriculum. Instead, it outlines 
a conceptual approach with practical application in the context of 
classroom teaching. 
As a result of its focus on what teachers need to know and be able 
to do, the taxonomy of thinking skills adopted here differs from other 
important work 7  on curriculum design and regulatory requirements 
                                               
5  Anthony S Niedwiecki, ‘Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to Legal 
Education’ (2006) 13 Widener Law Review 33. 
6  Smart Casual identified eight initial dimensions of legal curricula warranting the 
provision of professional development resources to sessional teachers. It took cues 
from the Law Threshold Learning Outcomes, a review of the wider literature on legal 
education, surveys of sessional academics in three law schools, and national 
consultation with Associate Deans of Learning and Teaching and other experts in 
legal education. It also drew on the feedback provided by focus groups of sessional 
teachers who trialled the resources developed in the first phase of the project. Smart 
Casual modules are designed for self-paced professional development of sessional 
law teachers. Smart Casual, The Smart Casual Professional Development Modules 
<https://smartlawteacher.org/modules/>. 
7  For thinking skills, see, eg, James, above n 4; Nickolas James, ‘Embedding Graduate 
Attributes Within Subjects: Critical Thinking’ in Sally Kift et al (eds), Excellence 
and Innovation in Legal Education (LexisNexis, 2011) 69. 
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which starts with the text and import of the Law Threshold Learning 
Outcomes (‘TLOs’) published in the Discipline Standards for Law.8 It 
advances knowledge in the field through its integration of skills that 
might otherwise be treated separately, providing both an overview of 
each component skill together with a synthesis of all three. The aim is 
to present the complexity of ‘thinking like a lawyer’ to afford law 
teachers with additional insights into student learning – in a way that 
might be applied in class. 
This article begins with an analysis of three of the many component 
skills in the ‘thinking like a lawyer’ construct – legal problem solving, 
reading law, and critical legal thinking – and the way in which the three 
aligned Smart Casual thinking modules have interpreted these 
components. It explains the decisions made as to the structured 
approach to each, with a view to providing tools directly applicable to 
the classroom. The second part then illustrates how the components 
adopted in the three modules interrelate as part of a nexus, a seamless 
mode of thinking ‘like a lawyer’. In doing so, it shows how a scaffolded 
approach to the teaching of discrete thinking skills in law is better 
understood as part of a larger, more complex whole. 
II  SCAFFOLDING TEACHING TO THINK LIKE A LAWYER 
Thinking skills are considered important in higher education 
generally. This aligns with indications that employer groups rank 
‘critical thinking and analytical skills’ highly in terms of graduate 
employability. 9  Accordingly, graduate attributes of most Australian 
universities include at least some reference to thinking skills. 10 The 
importance of thinking skills in law is evident from the TLOs, though, 
as Nickolas James explains, the TLOs canvass a variety of more 
particular skills.11 James suggests that collectively these skills could be 
described as ‘thinking like a lawyer’ although this term is not without 
                                               
8  Kift, Israel and Field, above n 3; see also the subsequent Good Practice Guides 
available at Legal Education Associate Deans Network, Resources – Good Practice 
Guides <http://www.lawteachnetwork.org/resources.html>. 
9  See, eg, Foundation for Young Australians ‘The New Basics: Big Data Reveals the 
Skills Young People Need for the New Work Order’ (Report, Foundation for Young 
Australians, 2016) <http://www.fya.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-New-
Basics_Update_Web.pdf>; Graduate Careers Australia, What Employers Want 
(2016) <http://www.graduatecareers.com.au/careerplanningandresources/starting-
your-search/graduateskillswhatemployerswant/> although problem solving and 
analytical skills had reduced in importance in the 2014 Graduate Outcomes Survey 
after consistently sitting at the third most important for many years. Graduate Careers 
Australia, Graduate Outlook 2014: Employers’ Perspectives on Graduate 
Recruitment in Australia (2015) 16 <http://www.graduatecareers.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Graduate_Outlook_2014.pdf>. 
10  Wendy Green, Sarah Hammer and Cassandra Star, ‘Facing Up to the Challenge: Why 
is it so Hard to Develop Graduate Attributes?’ (2009) 28 Higher Education Research 
& Development 17, 21; John Clanchy and Brigid Ballard, ‘Generic Skills in the 
Context of Higher Education’ (1995) 14 Higher Education Research & Development 
155; Anna Jones, ‘Redisciplining Generic Attributes: The Disciplinary Context in 
Focus’ (2009) 34 Studies in Higher Education 85, 86. 
11  James, above n 4. 
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its own problems.12 Without entering into the debate around the term, 
this article is based on the proposition that the three component skills 
are all recognisable as lawyering skills, and together constitute a suite 
of skills that reflect what is, for convenience, called ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’.13 
The Smart Casual project found that from the perspective of a law 
teacher, the three components of thinking skills are identifiable as 
requiring specific instruction, yet many sessional academics feel 
underprepared to teach them to students. From this starting point, our 
analysis has taken form in a more generalised way that might 
encompass the likely experiences of all legal academics. Many (if not 
most) legal academics have graduated with a law degree that would not 
have covered the TLOs for law, which form a consensus model of the 
future of Australian legal education. Future legal education thus 
depends on teachers’ capacity to use skills that were not explicitly 
modelled to them as students.  
It is important to note that these thinking skills are not novel – they 
have long been the cornerstone of legal practice. In the past however, 
such skills were largely learnt by osmosis or trial and error, principally 
through a focus on legal problem solving throughout the degree.14 It 
was assumed that the learning of such skills was immanent in the 
curriculum. With massively increased numbers of law students, 15 
changes to high school education, and a constantly evolving higher 
education environment16 it is no longer sufficient for such skills to be 
learnt implicitly, and many teachers perceive a student skill gap they 
were unaware of as students. 17  Our work on Smart Casual has 
confirmed that while all teachers have these skills, understanding how 
to encourage their development in others requires a separate set of 
skills.  
                                               
12  Ibid. See also Macmillan, above n 2. 
13  The approach and content of the modules proposed by Smart Casual have been 
endorsed by the Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD) and the Legal Education 
Associate Deans (LEAD) and reflect the TLOs for law. The extensive national 
consultation on which the TLOs were based gives a very strong indication that 
contemporary legal practice demands graduate capabilities that go beyond those of 
the past. 
14  See, eg, discussion in Penny Carruthers, Natalie Skead and Kate Galloway, 
‘Teaching, Skills and Outcomes in Australian Property Law Units: A Survey of 
Current Approaches’ (2012) 12(2) Queensland University of Technology Law and 
Justice Journal 66. 
15  Analysis by the Australian Financial Review has found that ‘the number of domestic 
bachelor and post-graduate law finishers in 2014 was up by more than 1200, or 9 per 
cent, year-on-year’ in Emma Tadros and Katie Walsh, ‘Too Many Law Graduates 
and Not Enough Jobs’ Australian Financial Review (online), 22 October 2015 
<http://www.afr.com/business/legal/too-many-law-graduates-and-not-enough-jobs-
20151020-gkdbyx#ixzz4TWdYECrU>.  
16  Summarised, eg, in Pauline Collins, ‘Australian Legal Education at a Cross Roads’ 
(2016) 58(1) Australian Universities’ Review 30. 
17  See, eg, Mary Heath et al, ‘Beginning to Address “the Elephant in the Classroom”: 
Investigating and Responding to Australian Sessional Law Teachers’ Unmet 
Professional Development Needs’ (2015) 38 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 240, 255. 
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Three of the Smart Casual modules embody some or all of the 
components of TLO 3 (‘thinking skills’), but are organised according 
to the identified needs of sessional law teachers, resulting in three 
discrete modules: reading law, and critical legal thinking, and problem 
solving. Categorising skills in this way has resulted in some insights 
into the complexity of the tasks facing both students as learners, and all 
legal academics as teachers. In particular, as we have observed the often 
complex connections between each ostensibly discrete skill, we have 
sought to articulate how the teaching of these skills might be scaffolded, 
an approach to educational design that ‘helps learners develop 
independence, fluency and range of performance as they move along 
the development continuum from novice to expert’.18  
A  Reading Law 
The first skill students attempt to master in legal studies is the 
reading of legal texts. Reading law permeates introductory units and 
their textbooks and, more recently as a result of intervention by the 
admitting authorities, one aspect of reading law, statutory 
interpretation, is taking on a higher profile throughout the degree.19 For 
law teachers, including those who were not taught explicitly how to 
read law, the skill is likely to have become intuitive. Without guidance, 
it can be difficult for the expert to articulate to the novice how to 
comprehend and make use of complex and diverse genres of legal 
writing. For the novice law student, reading law is the crucial 
foundation skill they require to advance in their law studies. Without 
proficiency in reading law, they will not have the materials with which 
to engage in critical legal thinking nor to solve legal problems. 
Beyond simply reading for meaning, critical reading is a form of 
critical thinking. A critical reader must ‘read against the text’, looking 
to find what the author has not said as much as understanding what has 
been said.20 This characteristic of lawyerly reading is a learnt skill that 
involves a complex process of de-constructing and re-constructing 
passages into propositions and data that are legally relevant. A skilled 
reader is also aware of the techniques that the authors have used in the 
manner of writing to convince readers or to delimit meaning.21 
As with any complex skill, students must develop techniques of 
critical reading specific to law. These include recognising when terms 
of art are used, the meaning implied by the placement of text within 
document structures (for example, the use and limitations of headnotes 
in judgments, or headings in statutes), and strategic reading methods to 
                                               
18  Stuart Levy and Holly Campbell, ‘Promoting Motivation and Engagement among 
Academically at Risk Students’ (2007) 9(3) Widening Participation and Lifelong 
Learning 17, 22. 
19  Jeffrey Barnes et al, ‘Good Practice Guide to Teaching Statutory Interpretation’ 
(Good Practice Guide, Council of Australian Law Deans, June 2015). 
20  Elizabeth Fajans and Mary R Falk, ‘Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back 
to Texts’ (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review 163. 
21  See generally Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to ‘Think 
Like a Lawyer’ (Oxford University Press, 2007) 100. 
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make sense of large documents (such as use of defined terms, indexes, 
skimming and re-reading).  
In addition to unfamiliar reading techniques, the nature of the 
documents students read can also be unfamiliar and therefore require 
the acquisition of a further layer of skills particular to each genre of 
legal writing. For Australian students, law is principally found in 
statutes and regulations, case law, and private legal documents – each a 
discrete genre with its own interpretive requirements. To identify the 
rights and duties, opportunities and restrictions, rewards and 
punishments imposed on people’s behaviour, the lawyer must be skilled 
in interrogating and unpacking the text in these complex, non-intuitive 
forms of writing.  
For example, legal judgments are often written in a narrative essay 
style, frequently without headings, and focus on an individual issue, 
rarely offering explicit indications of the law as it is applicable to other 
future situations. Readers must thus winnow general principles 
applicable to future scenarios from the detailed analysis of the facts of 
the case. Judicial referencing, legal and literary conventions are 
unfamiliar to the lay person and all require decoding. Making sense of 
case law requires attention to the context within and external to the 
written judgment, both of which are also crucial to understanding of the 
doctrine of precedent.22  
In contrast, statutes, legislative instruments, and regulations aim for 
precise description in concise language. Whereas judgments look to 
definitely resolve a historic incident, statutes speak to all future 
incidents, seeking to pre-determine legal outcomes through abstract 
descriptions of possible future behaviour. Despite the goal of clarity, 
the abstract nature of the language can mean that significant and often 
technical skill is needed to understand conventions. Additional 
knowledge of the body of law surrounding the correct approaches to 
determining textual meaning, the context of the provision, and the 
overall purpose of the statute are also needed.23  
The products of private law, such as contracts, trust deeds and wills, 
may seek to establish norms of behaviour through concise wording but 
they too must be submitted to interpretative conventions and a range of 
judicially imposed implications to supplement the express terms. 24 
Likewise, procedural law demands adherence to prescribed form and 
conduct derived from regulation. In addition to interpreting language, 
law students must identify when implications are appropriate. 
As highlighted in the case of statutory interpretation and through the 
doctrine of precedent, significant bodies of law exist providing 
interpretive directives as to the ‘correct’ way to read. Reading law thus 
occurs not simply in an English literacy sense – although this is 
important – but alongside substantive law itself. 
                                               
22  Michael Kirby, ‘On the Writing of Judgments’ (1990) 22 Australian Journal of 
Forensic Sciences 104. 
23  See, eg, Tom Gotsis (ed), Statutory Interpretation: Principles and Pragmatism for a 
New Age (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 2007). 
24  Scott J Burnham, ‘How to Read a Contract’ (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 133. 
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Although not an explicit focus within the framing of thinking skills 
adopted in this project, it is important also to mention that in addition 
to critical reading, to interpret (and therefore to use) the law creatively 
requires yet further higher order skills:  
Lawyers work with words, so most of our creative acts involve the 
construction of new language and interpretation of existing language, 
creating new concepts from whole cloth or from the interstices of 
statutory, regulatory or contractual gaps.25 
How law is read is also linked to theories of the role of law, 
including philosophical, ideological and moral ideas, imposing a further 
interpretive lens as to the context and purpose of words. 26 For this 
reason, the law graduate must understand how people with diverse 
world-views will read law and doing this requires self-awareness of 
their own interpretative lens.27 
Extracting or creating meaning, propositions and legally relevant 
facts from texts is implicitly a process of critical analysis and thinking. 
Placing that data within broader considerations and assessing its 
strengths and weaknesses is a process of explicit legal critical thinking. 
B  Critical Legal Thinking 
In addition to the literature on critical thinking generally, there is a 
well-developed literature on critical legal thinking. 28  As a field of 
inquiry, critical thinking attracts diverse views, with some claiming it 
as a generic higher order cognitive skill, and others suggesting that it 
only becomes relevant within a particular disciplinary context. 29 
Without entering into this debate, for legal educators critical thinking is 
necessarily taught within the context of the discipline of law. Indeed, 
the implication from studies analysing critical thinking skills is that  
while critical thinking skills themselves transcend specific subjects or 
disciplines, exercising them successfully in certain contexts demands 
domain-specific knowledge, some of which may concern specific 
methods and techniques used to make reasonable judgments in those 
specific contexts.30 
                                               
25  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 'Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and 
Teachable in Legal Education?' (2001) Harvard Negotiation Law Review 97, 127.  
26  Nick Johnson, ‘The Lecturer, the Law Student and the Transmission of Legal 
Culture’ (2006) 40 Law Teacher 117. 
27  Clifford Geertz, ‘Found in Translation: On the Social History of the Moral 
Imagination’ (1977) 31 Georgia Review 788. We explore this aspect in more detail 
in Alex Steel et al, ‘Critical Legal Reading: The Elements, Strategies and 
Dispositions Needed to Master This Essential Skill’ (2016) 26 Legal Education 
Review (in press). 
28  See, eg, James, above n 1. 
29  See discussion in Philip C Abrami et al, ‘Strategies for Teaching Students to Think 
Critically: A Meta-Analysis’ (2015) 85 Review of Educational Research 275; Jones, 
above n 10. 
30  Peter A Facione, Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes 
of Educational Assessment and Instruction – Executive Summary (California 
Academic Press, 1990) 5.  
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Appleby, Burdon and Reilly point out that there is ‘no consistent 
definition’ of critical thinking.31 Additionally, they observe that in the 
context of the law critical thinking has both ‘immanent and extrinsic 
qualities’. 32  In broad terms, however, critical thinking can be 
considered as the 
[a]ctive, persistent, and careful consideration of a belief or supposed 
form of knowledge in the light of the grounds which support it and the 
further conclusions to which it tends.33 
One key division in the critical thinking scholarship is between a 
narrow view of critical thinking as competency in logical reasoning, 
and a broader conception that incorporates a critical and reflective 
disposition.34 Smart Casual adopts this broader conception and sees 
critical thinking as a mental process that extends beyond ‘black letter’ 
reasoning. In the legal context, critical thinking encompasses 
interpretation, analysis and evaluation of legal claims and arguments. 
But it also incorporates assessing the alignment of legal doctrines and 
rules in light of legal and political standards, jurisprudential 
frameworks, legal theories, ideological and theoretical standards, 
frameworks from other disciplines and ethical models and professional 
codes.35  
While this explains the context for critical thinking in law, it was 
important for Smart Casual to conceptualise how this occurs so that we 
could develop a toolkit for law teachers to assist students to develop 
their own critical thinking. To this end, Byrnes and Dunbar36 outline 
the contours of critical thinking that have been used to inform the 
project’s approach. Their overarching observation is that critical 
thinking is metacognitive and reflective, requiring ‘thinking about your 
own or someone else’s thinking’. 37  The metacognitive element 
demands that the thinker should reflect on their biases and not 
uncritically accept their own perspective. Thus its evaluative contour 
involves considering the quality of an argument and this requires the 
thinker to be ‘skeptical and moderately distrusting’.38  
The analytical component requires the thinker to identify and 
scrutinise the processes involved in gathering evidence to support the 
argument in question, and how that evidence has been evaluated. This 
too has a metacognitive element in that to engage in this process 
                                               
31  Gabrielle Appleby, Peter Burdon and Alexander Reilly, ‘Critical Thinking in Legal 
Education: Our Journey’ (2013) 23 Legal Education Review 345, 347.   
32  Ibid 348. 
33  John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), 
cited in Alec Fisher, Critical Thinking: An Introduction (Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 4. 
34  See, eg, James R Elkins, ‘Alternating Currents: One Teacher’s Thinking about the 
Critical Thinking Movement’ (1999) 23 Legal Studies Forum 379. 
35  James, above n 1. 
36  James P Byrnes and Kevin N Dunbar, ‘The Nature and Development of Critical-
Analytic Thinking’ (2014) 26 Educational Psychology Review 477, 480–1. 
37  Ibid 480, citing Deanna Kuhn, ‘A Developmental Model of Critical Thinking’ (1999) 
28(2) Educational Researcher 16. 
38  Byrnes and Dunbar, above n 36, 481. 
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requires an understanding of the mode of developing domain-specific 
(legal) knowledge. Finally, Byrnes and Dunbar observe that critical 
thinking is ‘effortful, potentially time-consuming, and mentally 
taxing’.39 This insight is useful for the law teacher in raising awareness 
of the additional cognitive processing capacity required in critical 
thinking beyond that needed for lower order thinking skills.  
Using Byrnes and Dunbar’s contours to inform the approach to 
critical legal thinking extends the scope of the Smart Casual approach 
beyond that identified by TLO 3 (‘thinking skills’). Arguably, by 
incorporating metacognition as integral to critical legal thinking, the 
‘thinking skill’ begins to overlap with TLO 6 (‘self-management’). 
Indeed, there are links to the resilience components of the Smart Casual 
module on Wellbeing, indicating the fluid boundaries of ostensibly 
discrete skills. The broad conception of critical thinking adopted by 
Smart Casual also incorporates aspects of TLO 1 (‘knowledge’), 
particularly the broader contexts within which law operates and the 
complex issues they raise.40 Incorporating metacognition in this way 
may start to address some of the criticisms of the lack of ‘soft skills’ in 
legal education more broadly – thus supporting law teachers in teaching 
a more contemporary law curriculum. It also can help to support the 
understanding that to solve legal problems effectively requires more 
than technical skill. 
C  Problem Solving 
Bentley points out that ‘legal reasoning is usually a fundamental 
element in the teaching and understanding of law in common law 
countries’.41 It is also central to the work lawyers (and law graduates in 
many other fields) undertake in professional life.42 The use of problem 
solving exercises in substantive law subjects in Australian law schools 
(as well as those in the United States) is accordingly widespread.43 The 
typical hypothetical scenario used in class and examinations involves 
fact patterns designed to raise one or more issues within a specific area 
of law.44 Depending on curriculum design however, students may be 
                                               
39  Ibid. 
40  See, eg, Alex Steel, ‘Good Practice Guide (Bachelor of Laws): Law in Broader 
Contexts’ (Good Practice Guide, Australian Learning & Teaching Council, June 
2013). 
41  Duncan Bentley, ‘Using Structures to Teach Legal Reasoning’ (1994) 5 Legal 
Education Review 129, 129. 
42  Niedwiecki, above n 5, 58–9. Cf Ann Sinsheimer and David J Herring, ‘Lawyers at 
Work: A Study of the Reading, Writing, and Communication Practices of Legal 
Professionals’ (2016) 21 Legal Writing Journal (forthcoming). 
43  Jones, above n 10; Nelson P Miller and Bradley J Charles, 'Meeting the Carnegie 
Report's Challenge to Make Legal Analysis Explicit – Subsidiary Skills to the IRAC 
Framework' (2009) 59 Journal of Legal Education 192; Alex Steel and Dominic 
Fitzsimmons ‘Assessing Problem based and Experiential Learning: Answering Legal 
Problem Questions in a Grid Format’ in Kathryn Coleman and Adele Flood (eds), 
Marking Time: Leading and Managing the Development of Assessment in Higher 
Education (Common Ground Publishing, 2013). 
44  Bentley, above n 41, 130; Steel and Fitzsimmons, above n 43. 
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expected to grapple with knowledge and skills other than those 
belonging to the one discrete area of law. For example, statutory 
interpretation is frequently taught as substantive law and process within 
the context of a particular doctrinal field.45 The same can be said of the 
doctrine of precedent. 
Through practice, students are expected develop the problem 
solving skills needed to deal with real-world legal problems creatively 
and effectively.46 It is therefore important that students acquire legal 
problem solving skills that are transferable outside of class, and away 
from structured prompts and the safety of a distinct legal subject. In 
other words, the (micro) skill of problem solving as the direct 
application of a discrete portion of law to a factually bounded scenario 
is necessary to develop students’ legal problem solving abilities – but it 
is not sufficient of itself as legal thinking. Rather, problem solving 
requires critical thinking and reasoning skills, such as the evaluation of 
statements or evidence and inductive, deductive and analogical 
reasoning. 47  It is also a creative skill that stretches to include the 
identification of opportunities to resolve legal problems without 
recourse to adversarial approaches: legal problem solving involves 
creating solutions to legal problems, and most legal problems will be 
resolved outside of court.48 Law graduates need to be able to undertake 
problem solving as part of a repertoire of other thinking skills.49  
In the taxonomy of skills canvassed by Smart Casual, guidance in 
how to teach a structured approach to problem solving50 does not go so 
far as overtly addressing the elements of logic used in legal reasoning, 
or the possibilities of an expanded and non-adversarial approach to 
problem solving.51 The rationale for this choice reflects the aims of the 
project. Sessional teachers often do not have the capacity to construct 
curriculum (for example, to implement a non-adversarial approach) and 
Smart Casual is premised on providing support for teaching skills rather 
than for curriculum construction. The problem solving module 
therefore focuses on supporting sessional law teachers to articulate to 
students the structured processes of problem solving that are likely to 
                                               
45  See, eg, the vignettes below. 
46  Jones, above n 10; Jeffrey Metzler, ‘The Importance of IRAC and Legal Writing’ 
(2003) 80 University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 501. Whether this process 
succeeds is, of course, open to debate: Bobbi McAdoo, Sharon Press and Chelsea 
Griffin, ‘It's Time to Get It Right: Problem-Solving in the First-Year Curriculum’ 
(2012) 39 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 39, 53.   
47  Niedwiecki, above n 5, 60; Miller and Charles, above n 43.   
48  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 'The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: 
Creativity and Nonpartisanship in Lawyering' (1999) 72 Temple Law Review 785, 
786; Molly Townes O'Brien, 'Facing Down the Gladiators: Addressing Law School's 
Hidden Adversarial Curriculum' (2011) 37(1) Monash University Law Review 43, 
50, 55. 
49  Indeed this is reflected in the organisation of the TLOs: see Kift, Israel and Field, 
above n 3. See also Niedwiecki, above n 5, 60.  
50  Mary Heath et al, Problem Solving (15 August 2016) Smart Casual 
<https://smartlawteacher.org/modules/>.  
51  James, above n 4. 
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be adopted by most law schools. This foundation is, however, 
instructive in a broader application. 
The literature discussing whether and how to use structured 
approaches debates whether these systems are tools for teaching these 
skills to students, or a rote approach that risks precluding teaching them; 
and whether structured approaches erase creativity or ensure the 
acquisition of fundamental skills upon which creativity would 
necessarily be based. 52  As Carrie Menkel-Meadow has cautioned, 
adopting one approach to what lawyers can know and should be able to 
do may preclude other forms of knowledge and other skills.53 Similarly, 
George Gopen summarised the debate between rival approaches (and 
their acronyms): ‘These organizing structures are both necessary and 
dangerous, both supporting and defeating. As with any good idea… 
they can all be used for harm as well as good.’54 
The MIRAT framework used as an exemplar in Smart Casual55 – 
one of many such structured approaches56 – is presented as a tool to 
assist students to structure their legal arguments clearly. However, the 
module implicitly calls on law teachers to require students to read law 
and to think critically. For example, the first step ‘M’ (locating the 
material facts) requires a constant switching between Bloom’s lower 
order ‘knowledge’ domains such as knowing what facts form the 
elements of the relevant general rules, and ‘cognitive’ domains that 
require insight into what it means to say that a fact is ‘material’; and the 
identification of facts that might be missing, exceptions that may come 
into play, and alternative arguments that may colour the relevance of 
particular facts. Authors such as Miller and Charles argue that reasoning 
is an explicit part of the ‘A’ (analysis or argument) in MIRAT or IRAC; 
but reasoning is implicit in the formation of ‘R’ (rule) as well.57 
Determining that something is a fact for legal purposes is itself a 
higher order cognitive task. Law students are required to re-learn within 
a legal mindset what are ‘facts’ and what are not. Facts are only details 
of a scenario that can advance legal claims based on statute or 
precedent,58 and material facts are those relevant to the current legal 
issue. 
                                               
52  See, eg, Linda Morton, ‘Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A Paradigmatic 
Approach’ (1998) 34 California Western Law Review 375; Greg Taylor, ‘Structured 
Problem-Solving: Against the ‘Step-by-Step’ Method’ (2006) 11(1) Deakin Law 
Review 89; George Raitt, ‘Preparing Law Students for Legal Practice: Or, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Embrace Uncertainty’ (2012) 37 Alternative Law 
Journal 264, 268.   
53  Menkel-Meadow, above n 48, 787, 791; O'Brien, above n 48, 48. 
54  George D Gopen, ‘IRAC, REA, Where We Are Now, and Where We Should Be 
Going in the Teaching of Legal Writing’ (2011) 17 Journal of the Legal Writing 
Institute xvii, xviii. 
55  John H Wade, ‘Meet MIRAT: Legal Reasoning Fragmented into Learnable Chunks’ 
(1990) 2 Legal Education Review 283.  
56  Gerald Lebovits, ‘Cracking the Code to Writing Legal Arguments: From IRAC to 
CRARC to Combinations in Between’ (2010) 82(6) New York State Bar Association 
Journal 64; Gopen, above n 54. 
57  Miller and Charles, above n 43, 202. 
58  William M Sullivan et al, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 
(Wiley, 2007), 56. 
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One of the advantages of adopting a structured formalistic approach 
to problem solving is that it provides law teachers themselves with the 
means of deconstructing a process that may have become intuitive to 
them. Smart Casual adopts a ‘reflective teacher’ approach, prompting 
contemplation as to the difference in experience and knowledge 
between the teacher and student – arguably a useful approach for all law 
teachers. Law teachers – whatever their background – may solve legal 
problems intuitively, but students are still developing this skill and 
require a structured approach to practise it.59  
In presenting a structure and an explicit method for law teachers to 
interrogate their own problem solving, and thus to share their 
experience with students, the formal approach instils some of the 
dispositions recognised as integral to critical thinking60 and to ‘soft’ 
legal skills more broadly.61 It also offers strong opportunities to invite 
students to think creatively and both inside and outside the adversarial 
frame.  
These are reinforced by the module on reading law that emphasises 
the critical stances taken by legal readers, and the module on critical 
legal thinking that encourages thinking beyond instrumentalist logics. 
Together they aim to encourage a reflective use of these problem 
solving techniques as heuristic scaffolds to a more nuanced ability in 
students. 
III  INTEGRATING THINKING SKILLS 
As James implies, reading law, critical legal thinking, and problem 
solving can be understood as independent skills. Yet, taken together, 
they form part of a nexus, an integrated whole that lies at the heart of 
the intellectual skill of lawyering. However, what lawyers might take 
for granted in terms of what it is that they do in practice may not be so 
clear to law students. This is likely to be the case so long as components 
of thinking are taught – or presented – as discrete elements. It is 
therefore incumbent upon the law teacher to spell out consciously what 
might be described as the macro and micro aspects of thinking like a 
lawyer, ie identifying reading law, critical legal thinking, and problem 
solving as skills in their own right (micro) and at the same time 
recognising them as a synthesised whole (macro). 
Bloom for example provides an overarching taxonomy of cognitive 
objectives that is widely applied in higher education in formulating 
learning outcomes, and is relevant to thinking processes more 
generally. 62 In understanding what it is to ‘think like a lawyer’, the 
                                               
59  A similar approach underlies the Decoding the Disciplines project: Joan Middendorf 
and David Pace, ‘Decoding the Disciplines: A Model for Helping Students Learn 
Disciplinary Ways of Thinking’ [2004] (Summer) New Directions for Teaching and 
Learning 1. 
60  Ibid.   
61  Sally Kift, ‘Lawyering Skills: Finding Their Place in Legal Education’ (1997) 8 
Legal Education Review 43. 
62  David R Krathwohl, ‘A Revision of Bloom's Taxonomy: An Overview’ (2002) 41 
Theory Into Practice 212. 
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taxonomy might be enhanced through acknowledging different types of 
legal thinking that together comprise not just learning the law, but 
thinking like a lawyer. Bloom’s is not the only taxonomy, and others 
may well explain more aptly the diverse goals of a comprehensive legal 
education.63 For our purposes, however, Bloom’s cognitive objectives 
are one useful framing within which to understand the skills canvassed 
in the three Smart Casual thinking modules. 
Some maintain that Bloom’s taxonomy is necessarily linear and 
sequential, while others prefer an iterative understanding of cognitive 
processes. 64  In analysing legal thinking, we prefer the iterative 
approach. While all legal thinking is necessarily grounded in 
knowledge of the law, it is difficult to identify any one ‘entry point’ to 
full comprehension and utilisation of that law – especially in diverse 
contexts. For example, advising a client on legal options in response to 
a personal injuries claim under a prescribed scheme will differ from 
preparing a parliamentary submission on tort law reform. Legal 
thinking therefore involves an ability to move between layers of 
knowledge, depending on one’s own starting point and the task at hand. 
This in itself requires metacognition – a higher order cognitive skill 
relating to understanding when and how to apply particular skills, 
reinforcing the iterative nature of thinking. Metacognitive skills are 
crucial to prepare law students for the constant learning required of 
them in professional life.65 
Table 1 represents the relationship between different modes of legal 
thinking (representing the three thinking modules in Smart Casual in 
the middle three columns) characterised both in terms of Bloom’s 
taxonomy (in the left hand column) and layers of what might be called 
a ‘knowledge entry point’ involving legal knowledge or knowledge of 
broader contexts (in the right hand column). These entry points 
represent different – and layered – approaches to considering the 
applied intellectual skills of problem solving, legal reading and critical 
legal thinking.   
  
                                               
63  See, eg, Kift, above n 61; Christine M Venter, ‘Analyze This: Using Taxonomies to 
“Scaffold” Students’ Legal Thinking and Writing Skills’ (2006) 57 Mercer Law 
Review 621. 
64  See, eg, Nancy Nentl and Ruth Zietlow, ‘Using Bloom's Taxonomy to Teach Critical 
Thinking Skills to Business Students’ (2008) 15 College & Undergraduate Libraries 
159; Anat Zohar and Yehudit J Dori, ‘Higher Order Thinking Skills and Low-
Achieving Students: Are They Mutually Exclusive’ (2003) 12 Journal of the 
Learning Sciences 145. 
65  Niedwiecki, above n 5, 41.   
Galloway et al.: Working the nexus
Published by ePublications@bond, 2016
108 LEGAL EDUCATION REVIEW_______________________________VOLUME 26(1) 
 
Table 1 – Different modes of legal thinking 
 
Bloom’s 
cognitive 
objectives 
Problem 
solving Reading law 
Critical legal 
thinking 
Thinking 
mode 
                                                  
            
Knowledge 
entry point 
Knowledge Elements of 
law, 
authority 
Meaning of 
legal terms 
Elements of 
law, authority 
Text  
Comprehensio
n 
What facts 
are relevant 
Which rules 
are relevant 
Purpose of 
this text / 
genre; role of 
the text 
structure 
What is 
provided for, 
what is 
lacking in this 
law? 
Text context 
Application How does 
law apply to 
facts 
Legal 
doctrine, 
processes that 
frame the text 
eg statutory 
interpretation
; doctrine of 
precedent 
What policy 
consideration
s have been 
brought to 
bear/omitted? 
Legal context 
Analysis Broader 
theoretical / 
social 
context 
underpinnin
g law / facts 
that might 
bear on the 
problem 
What is the 
social context 
of this law, 
what theory 
supports / 
opposes it 
How does this 
law stand 
against social 
or legal 
theory? What 
assumptions 
are embedded 
in law? What 
are the social 
implications? 
Social / 
theoretical 
context 
Synthesis  Propose a 
solution to 
the problem 
Make a 
choice as 
between the 
layers of 
knowledge, 
to ascertain 
meaning of 
text 
Proposal as to 
how the law 
might address 
a social / 
theoretical 
problem per 
selected 
critical frame 
Text + 
contexts 
Evaluation  What 
process have 
I adopted to 
reach this 
conclusion, 
is it limited 
& if so, 
how? What 
other 
solutions 
were 
available? 
What reading 
techniques 
have I used 
here, and are 
they fit for 
purpose? 
Where do I 
stand within 
this analysis – 
identity, 
emotions, 
bounded 
knowledge 
Metacognitiv
e reflection 
 
Despite the linear organisation of the table, its purpose is not to 
promote a linear approach – although many commencing law students 
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may indeed need to adopt a staged method in learning both the law and 
lawyering skills. Instead, thinking requires movement up and down the 
columns and (depending on the task at hand) across rows, gathering 
together cognitive elements. The table represents component elements 
of thinking like a lawyer in different guises. 
To illustrate how the components of thinking work together in the 
classroom, the following two vignettes draw on the authors’ experience 
in an entry-level criminal law subject, and second-year land law 
subjects. They highlight the underlying complexities in thinking like a 
lawyer but also the ways in which the three types of thinking 
represented in the Smart Casual modules work together iteratively in 
the classroom context. 
A  Vignette: Entry-Level Criminal Law 
One of the authors, Mary Heath, teaches at Flinders Law School 
where entry-level case reading, the doctrine of precedent and statutory 
interpretation are integrated into the teaching of criminal law. Most 
students will study public law and legal research and writing subjects 
concurrently with their first semester of criminal law.  The IRAC (Issue, 
Rule, Application, Conclusion) method of problem solving is taught in 
legal research and writing, and it is therefore desirable that it be 
modelled in classes in criminal law.   
The curriculum begins with entry-level information and then moves 
on to precedent and case reading, followed by murder as an example 
common law offence. Next comes an entry-level introduction to the law 
and principles of statutory interpretation, followed by the serious 
assault offences of causing harm and causing serious harm as example 
statutory offences.   
By the time students reach classes on causing harm and causing 
serious harm, the range of recently acquired skills they are required to 
use is extensive. At the most basic level of knowledge x reading law, 
students are still struggling with identifying which terms are legal terms 
and which are simply antiquated or less common English language that 
is not specific to law (text and context). Many are adjusting to the fact 
that words they have been using for years (‘cause’, ‘harm’, ‘voluntary’, 
‘reckless’) turn out to have very specific meanings in legal contexts and 
that these meanings are sometimes fixed (‘voluntary’ conduct has the 
same meaning no matter whether the student is looking at a driving 
offence or at a serious crime of violence), while others change (‘cause’ 
has a specific meaning established in cases in relation to murder and a 
related but not identical meaning established by a statutory provision in 
relation to causing harm).   
To identify material facts, students must be able to think about legal 
issues and the rules that raise those issues, as well as consider the 
provided facts in an attempt to sift through which are material and 
which are not. Their understanding of what makes a fact ‘material’ is 
still developing. The presence of ambiguous facts and conflicting 
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accounts of events gives rise to a great deal of unease. The complexity 
of this comprehension x problem solving task is high.   
To identify issues, the offence under consideration must be parsed 
into its elements, a process that is far from self-evident for a novice 
(knowledge x problem solving).   
Rule identification by this stage involves comprehension of the rules 
established by case law and statute (comprehension x reading law). It 
also requires students to comprehend the doctrine of precedent and rules 
of statutory interpretation and how they interact, and then to apply these 
complex concepts to a range of texts in order to identify a rule (analysis 
x reading law). Having identified a rule, the rule itself must be applied 
to the material facts to construct an argument (application x problem 
solving).   
As the class considers whether an offence is aggravated or basic, we 
encounter wider issues in which policy considerations are more 
obvious, such as the definitions of ‘spouse’ and ‘domestic partner’, 
which have become more interesting to classes whose political memory 
encompasses years of debate on same sex marriage. They are 
understanding and analysing the law against a background of policy and 
principle (comprehension x critical thinking; analysis x critical 
thinking).  
By this stage the class has read the relevant second reading speech 
(comprehension x reading law), which sets out some of the context in 
which the legislation was passed and offers an opportunity to think 
about the ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric of the attorney general of the time 
as well as wider questions such as the obligation to criminalise torture 
(analysis x critical thinking).   
In an entry-level class, there is a tension between treating these as 
important considerations and recognising that the law is not established 
by the judgments of its readers. The capacity to analyse depends on 
fundamental comprehension having been achieved. If a student cannot 
grasp the concept of parliamentary supremacy and apply it, they will be 
unable to conceptualise the difference between the law as a set of rules 
(established, in this case, primarily by Parliament), and a critique of 
those rules, which does not in itself change the law (knowledge x 
reading law; application x reading law).  
In South Australia, ‘a person is the spouse of another if they are 
legally married’ for the purposes of the Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935 SA and for the time being, this means that we must look to the 
definition of ‘domestic partner’ if we want to know whether a man who 
assaults his male lover is committing an aggravated offence, no matter 
what the views of the class on the subject of same sex marriage may be. 
Students may reflect at various points of this discussion but sometimes 
require support to recognise this is what is occurring (evaluation x 
critical thinking). Rule identification as a formal step in the process can 
assist students in identifying legal rules as (open to interpretation but 
nevertheless) conceptually distinct from their values and/or the values 
of others, even where they may happen to overlap with their values or 
opinions (evaluation x critical thinking). 
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As we pass through each element of the offence, working our way 
through IRAC step by step, we are constantly switching between 
content (‘What does ‘harm’ mean in this context? Where does that 
meaning come from? Are there cases that can help us understand where 
‘harm ends and ‘serious harm’ begins?’) and process (‘Now we have 
identified the rule, how can we apply it to these facts to create an 
argument that the prosecution might use? How could the defence 
respond?’)  
B  Vignette: Second Level Land Law 
Another of the authors, Kate Galloway, has taught land law across 
two semesters in second year at James Cook University. The two 
subjects work together to scaffold student knowledge and skills, and are 
therefore considered here together. Students enter second year having 
undertaken introductory subjects including research, writing and 
analysis, and legal institutions and processes, but only having 
completed two substantive law subjects.66 Despite first year grounding 
in reading law, critical thinking, and problem solving, there are manifest 
challenges for students in developing these skills – and as with first 
level criminal law, there is a lot going on. 
The subjects are structured around legal doctrine (knowledge) but 
also embed the explicit teaching of statutory interpretation for the first 
time addressing an entire body of statute law in context, implicit 
application of the doctrine of precedent (together, application x reading 
law), introducing the equitable jurisdiction overlaid on the common law 
(knowledge x reading law), introducing reading private law instruments 
(comprehension x reading law), and promoting critical thinking skills 
particularly in terms of sustainability67 and Indigenous perspectives.  
First semester opens with the topic of the concept of property. 
Students are introduced to Indigenous conceptions of land in contrast to 
the Western liberal tradition. Further, land is contrasted with 
environment, 68  and as with the criminal law vignette, this often 
confounds student expectations of the meaning of English language that 
is not specific to law. Frequently students experience this topic as a new 
understanding of their world requiring reorientation as their 
expectations are challenged (evaluation x critical thinking). Many 
students select as the topic of their critical essay either a comparison of 
Western and Indigenous concepts of property and land, or property in 
the human body – both of which require students to grapple with the 
meaning of foundational concepts of the law (analysis, synthesis x 
critical thinking). 
                                               
66  Lisa Westcott and Mandy Shircore, ‘The Experience of a Small Regional Law School 
in Preparing Students for a Journey through Law’ (2006) 13 James Cook University 
Law Review 81. 
67  Kate Galloway, ‘Sustainability in the Real Property Curriculum: Why and How’ 
(2015) 8(2) Journal of Learning Design 31. 
68  Ibid. 
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While students are working on their essays over the first seven or 
eight weeks of second year, they are simultaneously learning and 
applying doctrine (knowledge, comprehension, application x problem 
solving, reading law). This is a known challenge for property law where 
‘[t]he language [is] arcane and each class introduce[s] something which 
seem[s] wholly unrelated to everything else …encountered previously 
in property law, other law subjects, and life in general’.69 
With the introduction of native title as common law recognition of 
customary law, and then with the introduction of the concept of equity, 
students are required to understand the limitations of the common law 
(application, analysis x critical thinking) while at the same time 
learning the structure and, to an extent, the content of these different 
sources of law (knowledge, application x reading law). 
Being asked to apply equitable principles as both a source of 
property rights and as a procedural framework for considering claims, 
students’ thinking must move between comprehension x problem 
solving and application x reading law. In contrast with a more linear 
approach (such as IRAC) that moves progressively through elements to 
reach a conclusion, analysing a problem involving equity can require 
weighing up of alternatives and making a value judgment (analysis x 
problem solving, critical thinking). IRAC is useful to a point, but 
students must switch between analysis and synthesis x problem solving 
and application x reading law to reach a solution. This aspect of 
thinking is not expressly represented within the IRAC model. 
Language also comes into play here. For example, the fraud 
exception to indefeasibility of title requires ‘actual fraud, ie dishonesty 
of some sort, not what is called constructive or equitable fraud’.70 That 
the common meaning of ‘fraud’ is a term of art and further, that there 
are varieties of fraud, presupposes a knowledge and understanding of 
the law that a second year student has not yet acquired. On the one hand, 
IRAC contemplates this as ‘R’ (rule). Students may cite this rule as part 
of their problem solving. But the ‘A’ (application) involves implicit 
knowledge of the difference between, say, actual fraud and constructive 
fraud. It is one thing to cite a rule, but another to afford its language 
meaning where a deeper understanding of the elements of the rule is 
required.  
Understanding the interplay between equity and common law itself 
represents a broader theoretical context of the law, that has evolved to 
meet social and economic need (application, analysis x critical 
thinking). For students still only half way through first semester in 
second year, underlying knowledge x problem solving is understanding 
which source of law is relevant – statute, case law, common law, equity 
– and what processes are required to read and to apply it. 
Policy considerations (application x critical thinking) permeate the 
subjects – married women’s property, the rise of equity to avoid Crown 
taxes, the evolution of feudal tenure in response to social change, 
                                               
69  Robert Chambers, An Introduction to Property Law in Australia (LBC Information 
Services, 2001) Preface, v. 
70  Assets Co v Mere Roihi [1905] AC 176, 210. 
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colonisation and racist assumptions to justify property, the need for 
strata title to deal with rising population density and the need for cost-
effective dispute resolution, the development of Torrens and e-
conveyancing … and so it goes. In each case, the need for social, 
economic, and environmental sustainability is canvassed, providing a 
unifying theme for consideration of the law’s effectiveness (analysis x 
critical thinking) and opportunity for reform (synthesis x critical 
thinking) – but also further thinking work in problem solving and 
reading law. 
In semester two, an additional layer of complexity is introduced 
through the interplay between statute, common law, equity, and private 
agreements (comprehension x reading law). The form and content of 
the agreements are novel for students although working through the 
structure reinforces reading strategies for statutes. Ascertaining the 
meaning and effect of the instruments, however, requires knowledge 
beneath application as it appears in IRAC. There is a simultaneous 
interpretation of the instrument and the application of statute and case 
law to get to the starting point of identifying the (‘I’) issues. 
 
Both of these vignettes illustrate the complexity faced by students 
learning to think like lawyers. But they also illustrate the complexity of 
teaching thinking skills. We have not included in these case studies the 
additional emotional and resulting cognitive load each student carries, 
quite independently of all else that is occurring in learning law. In 
omitting such considerations, we are not denying the impact of the 
student’s own circumstances on their experiences of learning the law. 
A fuller exploration of the teaching of thinking skills should incorporate 
affect beyond its inclusion in aspects of metacognition within critical 
thinking. This simply highlights the difficulty for law teachers in 
deriving a comprehensive view not only of discrete aspects of student 
learning, but each interrelationship. 
What the vignettes do offer, however, is an illustration of what the 
layers of process and knowledge might look like, what is implicit and 
explicit, and the interplay between modes of thinking that are integral 
to learning and teaching law right from the start. Even where curriculum 
is designed to scaffold students’ skills, in reality they still face all 
thinking modalities at once, in all layers of complexity, and not all are 
explicit. It is difficult to see how the law teacher can articulate to 
students the complexities of thinking like a lawyer without the requisite 
language and frameworks to strip the processes to components, and the 
ability to put them back together to suit the task at hand. 
IV  CONCLUSION 
From our work on both distinguishing and integrating the three 
thinking skills presented here, we draw two conclusions. First, we 
suggest that any single thinking skill is a necessary but insufficient 
component of ‘thinking like a lawyer’. Secondly, attempting to break 
down the macro of thinking skills into the micro might highlight its 
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constituent parts, but it does so at the expense of exploring the 
interconnections, pathways, and implicit or behind-the-scenes thinking 
that characterises legal thinking. It is likely that it is not possible to 
represent this, bearing in mind the central role of the learner’s own 
experience in constructing knowledge.71 Indeed, whether it is useful or 
even desirable to do so would be open to debate. 
Instead, the purpose of this analysis, and the representation of the 
variety of processes at play as students learn law, is to encourage our 
own reflection as law teachers on the process of thinking, and in 
particular, thinking like a lawyer; to raise awareness of the implicit and 
integrated nature of the instinctive reasoning of the experienced lawyer 
and how this contrasts with the student experience of learning.  
The three broad modes of legal thinking establish an overarching 
framework to support the teaching of thinking skills. The premise in 
selecting three ostensibly discrete skills is that each of these thinking 
skills not only can be taught, but also must be taught explicitly. Further, 
they each identify challenges experienced by learners and what can 
make it challenging for the law teacher to teach these skills, and share 
strategies that may be useful for law teachers in addressing these issues 
in the classroom.  
While raising awareness of the processes at play within the three 
aspects of thinking, each module refers (and is linked) to each of the 
others. They provide connections for law teachers between each micro, 
or discrete, skill and thus recognise the breadth of the thinking skillset 
involved in the study of law. 
This structured approach lays the groundwork for understanding 
one’s own legal thinking, and explaining it to students as a process. 
Each module recognises the need for an iterative approach in 
encouraging development in students’ thinking, and the effort72 and 
persistence – the character – that is required to develop, if not to master, 
legal thinking. 
As illustrated in the vignettes, the components of each mode of 
thinking represented in the modules encourage the articulation of the 
nexus between different thinking processes. Rather than masking the 
processes of problem solving for example, each element can contribute 
to a more comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the task at 
hand, to expose how the elements and processes work together. For the 
reflective teacher, regardless of their employment conditions, this offers 
the foundation for a comprehensive understanding not just of thinking 
like a lawyer, but the means by which to teach it, explicitly, to students. 
                                               
71  See, eg, David Jonassen, ‘Designing Constructivist Learning Environments’ in 
Charles M Reigeluth (ed) Instructional Design Theories and Models: A New 
Paradigm of Instructional Theory (Routledge, 1999) 215. 
72  Byrnes and Dunbar, above n 36. 
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